

group, this reviewer found two particularly interesting: Jon Sumida's thought-provoking exploration of Clausewitz's influence on Corbett, and the future potential for the study of *On War*; and, equally stimulating, Colin Gray's statement of the continuing relevance of sea power, in particular his questioning of the extent to which conventional Anglo-American sea power theory is applicable to second- or third-rate powers (pp. 32–35). Gray answers emphatically in the affirmative; however, it is possible that more exploration is required, as the participation of a large navy is one of the implicit assumptions of conventional sea power theory. Moreover, the influence of the United Nations *Law of the Sea Convention*, extending the degree of national jurisdiction of large portions of the most significant parts of the world's oceans, is a change to the axioms on which Mahan and Corbett operated.

The more numerous chapters on the rise of Australian naval power will be of interest to a broader audience than immediately evident. The RAN more than any other navy has grown from British antecedents modified through exposure to U.S. influence. As a result, in addition to its intrinsic value, Australian naval history provides perspectives on its two principal historical allies.

This book should certainly be held by all institutional libraries and is a worthwhile purchase for individuals as well.

Alastair Cooper

Sydney, Australia

Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-89096-969-8. Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xxiii, 264. \$34.95.

Joining the recent spate of books on Okinawa after World War II, Nicholas Sarantakes's *Keystone* is a readable, if unbalanced, account of American policy towards this strategic island. The author frankly admits that his is a traditional diplomatic history written from an American perspective. His explanation that "most books about Okinawa written in Japanese are mainly contemporary in nature, produced without access to documents or the detachment and perspective of time" (p. xxi), however, strikes this reviewer as an unfair dismissal of the rigorous scholarship of such distinguished Japanese historians as Miyasato Seigen, Kono Yasuko, and Gabe Masayuki. Some of the problematic arguments at the core of Sarantakes's book appear to stem from this asymmetry in his research.

Sarantakes weaves his crisp narrative around two key themes: Okinawa was a virtual U.S. colony and was essential to the U.S. military's successful double-containment of China and a resurgent Japan. Reexamining well-trodden ground, Sarantakes's first three chapters give an interesting look into the bureaucratic politics of the U.S. government and military and clearly delineate the evolution of American strategic thinking. The real prob-

lem with relying on American sources is revealed only when the focus turns to the virtual colonization of Okinawa. The United States pumped massive resources into the Okinawan economy during the 1950s and '60s. Although Sarantakes acknowledges that the goal was partially to co-opt the local population, he casts a fundamentally positive light on the resulting "material and economic prosperity of the islands." A more careful look into the deformed monstrosity that was the Okinawa economy of the past five decades makes this judgment highly problematic. Similarly, Sarantakes downplays the ferocity of Japanese attempts to regain control over Okinawa at such pivotal moments as the San Francisco peace treaty, the 1960 security treaty, and the island's reversion to Japanese rule. As recent multi-archival works by Robert Eldridge and others have shown, there is much more to the U.S.-Japan horse trading over Okinawa, even before occupation ended, than Sarantakes's study suggests. The seaminess of prereversion negotiations—and the extent to which Okinawans served as pawns in diplomacy between the two major powers in the Western Pacific—is also strangely deemphasized in his account. Such understatement keeps us from a full understanding of the betrayal of the Okinawan population by both Washington and Tokyo and a true appreciation of the indignities inflicted on this "keystone" island, its people, and its government under the U. S.-Japanese alliance.

Sayuri Shimizu

Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Empire and Revolution: The United States and the Third World Since 1945. Edited by Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001. ISBN 0-8142-5060-2. Notes. Bibliographical essay. Index. Pp. 295. \$22.95.

Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss have assembled an interesting and very informative collection of essays dealing with American foreign policy vis-à-vis the Third World (the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia) since the end of World War II. Some of the essays in the book appeared previously in *Diplomatic History* or the *Journal of American History*. The book is composed of ten essays (two of which were written by the editors), plus an introduction and a conclusion, also by the editors. The ten essays are divided into three chapters, "National Security and Counter-Revolution," "Culture," and "Economic Development."

The book opens with an excellent introduction ("The Challenge of the Third World") by Robert J. McMahon which provides historical perspective for the essays that follow. America's involvement in the Middle East is the topic addressed by Douglas Little ("His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis"), Peter L. Hahn ("The Influence of Organized Labor on U.S. Policy toward Israel, 1945–1967"), and Mary Ann Heiss ("Real Men Don't Wear Pajamas: Anglo-American Cultural Perceptions of